Consciousness by Rescher, Nicholas
© Symposion, 2, 1 (2015): 11-18 
 
Consciousness  
Nicholas Rescher 
 
Abstract: Consciousness is sometimes viewed as a particular parametric factor 
in the analogy of blood pressure or electric charge. The paper argues that this is 
an erroneous conception becomes consciousness involves a varied assortment 
of different phenomena that have no single unified commonality. And so even 
as ‘abnormal psychology’ has to be a disjointed assembly of diverse specialties 
so will ‘consciousness studies’ have to be. 
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1. What Is Consciousness? The Basic Issue 
Think of a door contrived to open automatically when a sensor detects an 
approaching person. We have here an effectively functional stimulus-response 
system. But there is no consciousness. The sensor detects but does not feel; the 
device responds appropriately but does not realize it. The system can be said to 
obtain information (a person’s approach) and to initiate appropriate action in 
response (in arranging for the door’s opening), but something crucial is absent. 
So just what is missing? There is one thing that clearly is – the intervention 
of a functioning mind. Only mind-endowed beings can be conscious.1 
Even denying that consciousness ever exists would comment one to 
having to specify what consciousness is – i.e. just what it would be if it actually 
did exist. Before inquiry about where consciousness is present and how it works, 
one ought really to begin by asking just exactly what consciousness actually is. 
And here it is helpful first to spell out a few things that consciousness is not, and 
what consciousness clearly is not includes such features as being: 
 a substance (like air) 
 a property of things (like their weight) 
 a state of things (like liquidity) 
Instead, consciousness is a capacity, a facility for having the awareness 
needed for a neutral grasp on things. It is a condition of mind through which 
creatures are open to a wide range of experience seeing that mental activity is 
(as least) tripartite in relation to the endorsement of beliefs affective pro/con 
evaluation, and the inauguration of actions. For the mind not only processes 
                                                                        
1 Some philosophically sophisticated discussions regarding consciousness that are relevant to 
the contextualizing of this paper are given in the References listed at the end. 
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information, it processes affectivity as well, seeing that we have pro- or con-
reactions to many acknowledged facts. (We not only accept that snake in the 
corner, but are horrified about it.) And moreover the mind can initiate action – as 
in situations of pre-planning. 
Consciousness is a mental-response capacity for developed beings. It is 
part of a dual reactivity. Stuck with a pin your body will react by withdrawal, 
your mind will react by feeling pain. This capacity is a gift of evolution. Like 
arithmetical computation or linguistic communication – or indeed intelligence 
itself – consciousness is something that emerges at a certain stage of complexity 
and sophistication in the course of organic evolutionary development. It is 
present only well up on the natter of evolutionary development. In this regard it 
is in the same boat as various other higher-level mental components, such as 
intelligence, reason, and evaluative effectivity and (very possibly) free will. 
Self-consciousness is a particularly sophisticated version of consciousness, 
a reflexive version that encompasses the functioning of self-awareness. This is a 
facility that has certainly evolved in humans but presumably not in lower 
animals. When you toss them bread crumbs you surely come to realize that 
sparrows can be aware of environmental developments. However, as best we 
can tell, there is no self-consciousness here. (You would find it hard to embarrass 
or insult them.) 
Conscious reactions can be evoked by physical stimuli but they are not 
constituted by them. Physical developments may be prominent in their causation 
but mental developments are paramount for their constitution. 
In humans factual knowledge (informative knowledge that in contrast to 
performative how-to knowledge) is always verbalized. But consciousness can 
outrun verbalization, and is thereby broader that factual cognition. The 
information that our consciousness places at our disposal is too extensive, 
complex, and convoluted for verbalization. There is no prospect of setting it out 
in linguistically explicit completeness. Conceivably, any individual item that 
figures in our consciousness can be verbalized in some way, but neither time nor 
space is available to deal with the entire lot. (Think here of the game of musical 
chairs: any one participant is in principle seatable, but one can never seat the 
whole lot.) 
2. Consciousness as a Capacity 
“I shall now count slowly to ten, and when I reach seven I shall wiggle the fingers 
of my left hand.” 
Here there is consciousness of myself as cogent, as well as awareness of 
certain performatory resources at my command (finger motion) and of my 
power of agency (of acting under pre-set considerations). These capabilities and 
capacities are not aspects of my physical make-up or physical nature – they 
relate not to how I am constituted but to what I can do. 
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Without the brain the mind cannot operate, but without the mind the 
brain is functionally helpless. In providing the brain/mind complex nature has, 
through evolution, created a collaborative partnership. Consciousness is an 
evolved capacity of mind-endowed creatures to become aware of the aspects of 
their setting. Its most developed form is self-awareness – explicit awareness of 
oneself with no self-conception can in principle be conscious of things. 
Consciousness is a disjunctive conception. To be conscious is to be able to 
perform any one of a long inventory of consciousness-indicative things. A wide 
variety of performances are inherently conscious-indicative: one can do them 
only when (fully) conscious: 
– recognize a friend 
– categorize something as instance of a type 
– understand a verbal communication 
– answer a question 
– describe a feeling 
– ‘get’ a joke 
– solve a puzzle. 
A person can be said to be actively or occurrently conscious when engaged 
in any one of many and varied consciousness-indicative operations. And it 
doesn’t seem as though this list can ever actually be completed.  
It is one things to have consciousness – to be capable of its exercise, and 
quite another to be actively engaged therein. (Conscious beings can sleep!) And 
consciousness-involving performances are interconnected – not invariably but at 
least statistically: when one can do one of them one also can so various others. 
To be a conscious being one must be able to perform some of them. But the range 
of the consciousness-indicating operations at the disposal of a consciousness 
capable being can be larger or lesser, varying both with the individuals and with 
the species. Both dogs and humans can function consciously, but humans can tell 
jokes while dogs cannot. Consciousness is clearly present whenever the mind 
does any of a considerable variety of things. 
But at this point a big question arises: Is consciousness some one 
particular sort of common factor or feature (except consciousness itself) that is 
present throughout the whole range of its occurrences? Or is consciousness 
something like combustibility – a feature possessed alike by wood, kerosene, 
oxygen, rubber, etc. which lack any other fact of unifying commonality. Is there 
some pervasive linking factor such that consciousness is the effect of its presence 
or is consciousness itself the unifier of its occurrences? 
By all available indications there is no unified consciousness producer: 
consciousness is a matter of the uniformity of product and not of any uniformity 
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of production. To all visible appearances, consciousness represents a uniformity 
of product rather that a uniformity of production. The unity of consciousness is 
not collective but distributive – a unity not of resulting but of result. The 
prospect of providing a set of necessary and sufficient indications for the 
presence of consciousness – apart from the circularity redundant indications of 
consciousness itself – is a hopeless proposition. 
What has to be going on for someone to be conscious of something? There 
just is no particular answer here – the appropriate response is simply: Any one 
of a considerable variety of things. There is no uniform route to consciousness: 
its presence is nowise a uniformity of productive process but merely a 
uniformity of result. Our initial question is like asking: What has to go on for 
someone to be wealthy. Once we get beyond tautology – respectively “he has to 
be aware of something,” “he has to have a lot of money” – there is nowhere else 
to go. There are just too many different ways to get there from here. The 
condition at issue – call it X – is such that there just is no uniform X-making factor 
or feature. The quest for any single definitive ‘basis of consciousness’ is quixotic 
and – to put it bluntly – pointless. 
With respect to its nature as a conception, mental consciousness is thus 
rather akin to mental illness. There are many and highly varied ways of being 
mentally ill and they can have very little to do with one another – indeed they all 
fail to fit any generally common features apart from qualifying as mental 
illnesses. And the same goes for consciousness. There just is no single uniform 
mental process that qualified as ‘being conscious.’ 
3. Consciousness: Not a Process of Procedure 
Our conscious-awareness functions sequentially, now this, now that. The result 
is the conception of a ‘stream of consciousness.’ This expression however, 
suggests a problematic continuity. What is actually at issue seems more like a set 
of discrete steps or links than a continuous stream. 
There are many things a conscious-capable being can do only when 
activity conscious. To be sure, breathing and perspiring are not among them, but 
remembering and joking certainly are. 
Like feeling, being conscious of something just happens – without pre-
planning or pre-arrangement. One can no more write an instruction book about 
feeling than one can about being aware of something. 
The question “How do I know that I am aware that there is a cup on the 
table?” is a lot like the question “How do I know that I feel cold?” or “How do I 
know that I don’t believe in the Tooth Fairy?” There simply is no “How I go about 
securing such knowledge,” no procedure for verifying that these things are so. I 
“just realize” these things, and the end of it. There is no definite process I use to 
acquire such knowledge, no procedure I follow for its realization. Awareness of 
things is not something I acquire by doing something, it is something that I have 
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in the circumstances. It comes to me automatically as a free gift of my capacities 
as an intelligent being. 
4. Consciousness Requires Correlative Brain Activity 
There is no question but that consciousness of something is the (invariable) 
accompaniment of correlative brain activity by doing something. But this does 
not mean that consciousness reduces to brain activity from a causal and 
productive standpoint. 
The coordinate consciousness with brain activity and to have it that these 
cannot be conscious without suitable brain activity is not to say that 
consciousness is the causal result of brain processes. Coordination is not 
causality. People are coordinated with those finger prints: different prints 
different people. But that does not mean that the finger points cause persons to 
be the individuals they are. 
Consider a group of ball-bearings spread out on a stretched rubber sheet. 
You now have a clearly correlative system – move the ball bearings and the 
shape of the sheet changes; alter the shape of the sheet and the ball bearings will 
move accordingly. To all visible appearances mind and the brain are coordinated 
in this way. Processual inaguaring is a two-way street: sometimes as the mind 
functions the brain responds correspondingly; sometimes as the brain functions, 
the mind responds. There is always coordinative agreement, but sometimes the 
one potency is in control of change and sometimes the other. Brain activity often 
controls the mind’s thought, but thought sometimes inaugurates brain 
responses. 
Brain activity and thought proceedings are interrelated in a complex 
relationship that exhibits the following features: 
1. Every thought process has a corresponding counterpart in brain-
activity: there are no ‘spooky’ (brain independent) thought processes. 
2. Some brain-activities have no corresponding counterparts at the level of 
thought at all – neither in conscious or unconscious thought. 
3. Not every brain-activity has a corresponding counterpart at the level of 
conscious thought. There is such a thing as an unconscious thinking. Moreover, 
4. Some brain activities cause thought responses (thought activities) that 
would not exist without them. Here brain-activity is the causal inaugurator of 
thought. 
5. Some thought activities cause brain responses: here thought is the 
causal inaugurator of brain-activity. 
In the operating of the brain/mind complex, the brain is the invariable 
participant in the overall processuality of what goes on. It is thus the senior 
partner of the enterprise. But it is not the invariable inaugurator of what goes on: 
the direction of initiative is left open. And this will work sometimes in the one 
direction and sometimes in the other. (The two factors are interlinked but which 
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is the free and which the dependent variable will be a matter of case-by-case 
determination.) 
The relation of brain/mind in relation to activity is like the situation of 
plane/pilot in relation to location. The pilot’s location is always coordinate with 
the plane: he does not go his separate way. But while their location change is 
generally managed by the plane itself (via its autopilot) it is occasionally 
managed by the pilot when he happens to take control. The initiative can work 
both say. Analogously, it is sometimes mind rather than brain that is the change-
initiating operative. 
5. Mistakes in Awareness 
There are certainly abnormal states of consciousness – in dreaming, say, or 
under the influence of drugs. One can certainly have the mistaken impression of 
being aware of things in the ordinary way. Unconsciousness is not the only 
alternative to consciousness, there is sub-consciousness and mis-consciousness 
(i.e., faux consciousness) as well. But only for beings capable of authentic 
consciousness can consciousness possibly malfunction. 
As a more or less typical experience consider a pin-prick and its associated 
withdrawal response. Unless numbed by anesthetic or otherwise lapsed into an 
“abnormal” condition we are certainly aware of such a development. Presumably 
it can be counter indicated by extra-ordinary intervention (such as posthypnotic 
suggestion), so that what ordinarily would be a normal response is evoked in 
abnormal circumstances. But even an abnormally produced pinprick sensation is 
still a perfectly real sensation, however extra-ordinary the mechanics by which it 
is evoked. And – be it authentic or inauthentic – it could certainly not be evoked 
in a being incapable of feeling, of mental experience, of consciousness. 
There is nothing automatically veridical about consciousness. 
Misimpressions can exist. We can take ourselves to be aware of a cat on the mat 
when it is actually a puppy. I can mistake one person as another. That tree we 
take ourselves to see may be a thing of smoke and mirrors. What we think of the 
things we are experiencing may fail to reflect their reality. 
But even being mistaken is a version of mental acuity: even 
misunderstanding is a mode of understanding and even thinking mistakenly is 
still thinking. 
Ordinarily cat sightings are produced by cats, pin-pricks by pins, shivers 
by cold. And such responses standardly occur via consciously apprehensible 
eventuations like cat-encounters or pin pricks. It is perfectly possible, however, 
that certain putatively cognitive experiences could be produced in a matter that 
is unwarrantedly and systematically inappropriate – that, for example, in a 
phantom limb situation someone feels as though he was receiving the handshake 
of a muscular friend. This sort of ‘sensory malfunction’ is certainly conceivable in 
various sorts of unusual circumstances. But that should prevail systematically – 
always, unavoidably, and with everyone – is effectively inconceivable given the 
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way in which human capacities evolve. Sense experience is our ground to action 
in this world, and if it were to mislead us standardly and systematically we 
would not be here to tell the tale. 
The question, “Can awareness be mistaken?” calls for drawing a crucial 
distinction. 
In ascribing to someone awareness of a particular state of affairs, we 
automatically concede correctness. 
Thus when I say that “Smith realizes that the cat is on the mat” or “Smith is 
aware of the cat’s being on the mat” I commit myself to the fact that the cat is on 
the mat. To put this factual commitment into suspension I would have to say that 
“Smith thinks (or believes) that the cat is on the mat” or “Smith is under the 
impression that the cat is on the mat.” These ways of facilitating the matter are 
commitment neutral regarding the declarer’s own position. And in this regard 
they differ from the negative extreme: “Smith mistakenly thinks there is a cat on 
the mat” or “Smith hallucinates a cat on the mat.” 
And the same sort of thing holds in one’s own case. The statement “I am 
aware of the tiger in the room” stakes the dual claim: “There indeed is a tiger in 
the room and I realize that this is so.” To be epistemically more cautious about it 
would require saying something like “I am aware that there is a large creature in 
the room and I take it to be a tiger” or even more indefinitely “Something is going 
on in the room which I construe as the shape of a large tiger.” However, 
unqualified awareness contentions carry verticality-claims in their wake. And we 
must thus distinguish between 
• the fact of awareness 
and 
• the awareness of fact. 
When I take myself to be aware of a cat on the mat, I cannot be mistaken 
about the fact of awareness itself – about my belief that there is a cat on the mat. 
It makes no sense to say “I believe there is a cat on the mat but might be wrong 
in thinking that I believe it.” I might be wrong in thinking what I believe, but 
cannot be wrong in thinking that I believe it. Of course that belief itself may very 
well be wrong: I could well mistake a small dog for a cat and a towel for a mat. 
The fact I claim to be aware of may be all wrong. But the fact of my having this 
awareness remains untouched by its error. 
The language works in such a way that certain experiences are self-
certifying. “I am conscious of its raining outside” might well be wrong – that 
pitter-patter could be a scrabbling squirrel. But “I am conscious of a strong odor” 
is something else again. Subjectivity stands on secure ground. When I am under 
the impression that there is a cat on the mat, I can be mistaken about the cat 
(and indeed the mat as well), but I cannot be mistaken about the impression. 
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What I am under the impression of may well be amiss, but my being under 
this impression stands secure, wholly unaffected by this mistake. 
6. Evidentiating Consciousness 
There is no public access-way to an individual’s subjectivity. Feelings and 
impressions are private property. The individual agent himself is the only one 
able to observe what is transpiring on the stage of his conscious awareness: 
anyone else knows this only through inference or by second-hand reportage. 
Second-party observations is impracticable. Brain activity can be monitored by 
observers, but awareness content cannot. 
This observational inaccessibly of a large section of cognition is an 
awkward roadblock to ‘cognitive science.’ The easy out for its practitioners is 
thus simply a ‘fox and grapes’-reminiscent course of denying that it exists. It is, 
however, simply a ‘fact of life.’ 
One cannot be conscious without being conscious of something any more 
than one can be afloat without floating on something. Feeling pain – one’s own 
pain, a pinprick for example – is a quintessential mode of awareness. This is not 
just a matter of an aversion/evasion response: that response does not constitute 
my pain experience, but rather evidentiates it for all to see. 
How can I tell what you are aware of? I cannot of course appropriate your 
experience: experience as such is not interpersonally transferrable. But you will 
have little difficulty in finding out a great deal about what I am aware of. For not 
only can I tell you a great deal about it, but often actions speak louder than 
words. When one voices an insult about me and I react angrily, you can be pretty 
sure my being aware of what was said. And when you tell a joke and I laugh you 
can be pretty sure I was aware of the utterance and ‘got the point.’ 
Consciousness is in many respects like gravity. We experience it alright 
but one certainly doesn’t observe it. What we observe is its effects and what one 
can know of it has to be inferred therefrom. As far as we are concerned gravity is 
what it does. And this of course does not automatically make us well-informed 
regarding either its nature of its origins. And consciousness is much like this. It 
manifests itself through its effects: primarily awareness and lived experience. 
Lives there a man with soul so dead who never to himself has said “I am 
aware that there is a cat on the mat over there?” And there is just no getting 
around this. The truth of the claim at issue rests on two facts. (1) That there is a 
cat on yonder mat, and (2) that the agent realizes that this is so. Of course if that 
cat turns out to be an error (it was a dog that was on the mat) or even an illusion 
(say a strange shadow) the agent will have to change his tune: “I mistakenly took 
something over there to be a cat.” But he need retract neither the awareness (of 
something going on) nor his impression (that he took this to be a cat). 
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7. Why Consciousness Seems Problematic/ Mysterious 
Many things are visible; many things are combustible. But they are not so 
through any across-the-board possession of some shared feature or fact 
constitutive of visibility or combustibility. There just is no initial condition of 
constitutes this condition, no visibility-producing or combustibility-engendering 
constituent. The only commonality among all visible (or combustible) things just 
the fact of this visibility itself. The only commonality there is is ex post facto and 
retrospective. And just this is the case with consciousness as well. The only thing 
common to all items that figure is our consciousness in that very fact of 
consciousness-involvement itself. 
Consciousness is not some type of stuff (like metal) not even a certain 
state of things (like magnetic attraction). It is, rather, a broad and diverse range 
of phenomena of different and divine sorts – variable things gather together 
under a common instance of communicative convenience. 
And so, just as there is not and cannot be any uniformly focused science of 
mental illness, there cannot be any uniformly focused science of consciousness. 
Even as ‘abnormal psychology’ has to be a disjointed assemblage of diverse 
specialties, so will ‘consciousness studies’ have to be. Neither constitutes a 
unified science. The manifold sort of conscious activity are certainly open to 
fruitful scientific study in their distinctive particularity. But consciousness itself 
is not, seeing that what is at issue with this idea lacks the integrity of thematic 
focus requisite for such an integrated enterprise. 
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